We study managers who simultaneously manage multiple mutual funds to provide new evidence on investors' performance-chasing behavior. Consistent with the idea that investors infer managerial ability from past returns, we show that flows into a fund of a multi-fund manager are predicted by the performance in both the corresponding fund and the other fund he manages. Performance in one fund predicts flows into the other fund more prominently when the fund does particularly well, and when the performance in the two funds is more different. Nonetheless, investors do not seem to move their capital sufficiently in response to performance in the manager's other fund; we find that past performance in one fund predicts subsequent performance in the other. This predictability is likely due to the presence of some investors who do not withdraw enough capital from a fund when their manager performs poorly in his other fund.
Introduction
Mutual fund investors allocate capital to funds that have performed well in the past. This performance-chasing behavior can be consistent with investors' rational inferences about managerial ability from past returns (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Berk and Green, 2004; Huang, Wei, and Yan, 2007, 2012) . However, there is a lack of consensus in the literature about whether individual investors in mutual funds have the required level of sophistication. Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004) and Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2010) find that some mutual fund investors are unable to make the right choice in the simplest possible context: they choose to stay with more expensive and worse performing index funds when cheaper alternatives are easily available. Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2010) suggest that trend-chasing appears related to behavioral biases rather than to rational learning.
In this paper, we utilize a recent development in the mutual fund industry -the emergence of managers who simultaneously manage multiple funds (aka "multi-fund" managers) -to shed new light on the above debate. The advantage of examining multi-fund managers is that there are extra signals on a manager's past performance that investors could use.
Specifically, we test if investors are sophisticated enough to learn about a manager's ability by using the past performance not only in the fund they consider investing in, but also in the other fund he manages.
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To further understand investors' response, we then study the cross-fund performance relationship, that is, whether past performance of one fund can predict subsequent performance in the other fund that the same manager manages. Consider a manager with two funds, F1 and F2, and suppose fund F2 has outperformed the benchmark. The question is:
if investors of F1 are sophisticated and know that flows drive down fund performance due to 1 While most multi-fund managers manage two funds, some manage more than two. Throughout our analysis, we pick the two oldest funds in the dataset from each multi-fund manager. The results remain unchanged if we pick two funds from each manager randomly.
decreasing returns to scale, how much more capital should they allocate?
2 If the allocation is not enough, then fund F1 will earn a positive risk-adjusted return since fund F1 will not be "large enough" to erode performance entirely. On the other hand, fund F1 will be "too large" and have negative risk-adjusted returns subsequently if too much capital is allocated.
We therefore test whether performance in one fund is followed by subsequent performance in the other fund that (i) has the same sign (insufficient response), (ii) has a different sign (more than sufficient response), or (iii) is not significantly different from zero.
Our first main finding is that, consistent with our conjecture, investors indeed make use of the manager's past performance in his other fund. We take the flow-performance regression specification employed by Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007) , and to this specification we add the past performance of the manager in his other fund. We find that flows into a fund are predicted by the other fund. The effect of the other fund is more prominent when its performance has been exceptionally good; it is one-third to half as strong as the fund in question if both of the manager's funds are performing very well. Besides, we show that the flow-performance results are stronger when the performance of the two funds is more different, i.e., when the signal provided by the other fund is likely to carry more additional information. The effects are unlikely to be driven by other characteristics.
We control for fund family effects, as well as run further "placebo" tests: we replace the manager's funds with funds that have similar characteristics but not managed by the same manager, and do not find the results.
For this multi-fund performance-chasing behavior to be consistent with investor sophistication, performance in the manager's fund should contain information about his ability in the other fund. In other words, if performance is a signal of skills, skills should not be entirely fund-specific. We study fund holdings and show that there is likely a manager-specific component of skills, as performance in the uncommon holdings of one fund can predict that of the other fund.
However, investors do not seem to move enough capital across funds in response to past performance in the manager's other fund. We find evidence of "insufficient response" from the cross-fund performance relationship. We sort all multi-fund managers into quintiles based on the past performance in one of their funds. We examine managers' performances in their other funds across these quintiles, forming portfolios with holding periods varying from 1 to 12 months. Our test shows that the highest quintile portfolio subsequently earns significantly higher alphas than the lowest quintile portfolio, which we also confirm by running a regression of a fund's future return on past performance of both funds. This predictability comes mostly from the lowest-quintile portfolio of multi-fund managers. The finding is consistent with our previous result that investors take more into account the manager's performance in his other fund when it is higher.
Our paper contributes to the understanding of performance-chasing behavior in mutual funds that has attracted enormous attention among academics. The results we document help distinguish between rational and behavioral explanations of the behavior; the flowperformance relationship is more prominent when the two funds are different, and there is evidence that manager-specific skills can be transferred between funds. Moreover, the positive cross-fund performance relationship suggests that a fund is likely to perform well when investors put more money into it because the other fund did well in the past. All these findings are unique to our setting of multi-fund managers, and are consistent with investor sophistication, under which investors learn about managers' ability from past performance and are rewarded in the process. Behavioral biases are unlikely the cause of such results.
However, contrary to the prediction by theory models, such as Berk and Green (2004), we believe that capital flows do not respond enough to a manager's overall performance. We conclude that investors are generally sophisticated, but may not be up to the level that theory models require.
We acknowledge that the latter result comes with one caveat: we cannot claim that it extends to the usual Our paper is also related to Huang, Wei, and Yan (2012) , who investigate the relationship between investor learning and the sensitivity of fund flows to performance, and to Yadav (2010) and Agarwal and Ma (2012) , who also look at multi-fund managers, but ask a different question regarding the effects of managerial multi-tasking in the mutual fund industry.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the sample of multi-fund managers and the empirical methods. Sections 3 and 4 present, respectively, the results regarding our two hypotheses: performance-chasing in multi-funds and the relationship between past performance in one fund and future performance in the other. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Empirical Methodology

Data Sources and Sample
We primarily use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free
Mutual Fund Database. The CRSP mutual fund database includes information on fund returns, total net assets (TNA), fees, and other fund characteristics including managers' names. However, while managers' names are provided by CRSP, a large panel of multi-fund managers is not readily available. This is because the names are not recorded consistently across time and funds: first and middle names are sometimes abbreviated differently and are sometimes excluded. We track all managers carefully and hand-construct our database of multi-fund managers, taking into account spelling differences and format changes. Sometimes the names do not match perfectly: we apply our best judgment by also estimating how common the names are (e.g., common last names are more likely to refer to different people).
We analyze all names that are available in CRSP and drop funds with missing managers'
one-fund-one-manager setting -it is plausible that investors respond to performance in the corresponding fund with the right level of capital flows, but respond insufficiently when it comes to the other funds managed by their fund manager.
names. From the CRSP data we are able to identify 8,184 distinct managers, with an average experience of about five years.
We focus on funds that are managed by a single person who manages more than one fund (i.e., we exclude funds that are managed by two or more people). Following Agarwal and Ma (2012), we also exclude cases where a manager runs more than four funds as these managers are likely to be team managers.
Our analysis uses funds with investment objectives of growth and income, growth, and aggressive growth. We identify fund investment objectives using the investment objective codes from the Thomson-Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database (formerly known as CDA/Spectrum); from which we obtain holdings data for our later analysis as well. Multi-fund managing is a rather contemporary development in the mutual fund industry.
Thus, our sample covers from 1992 to 2009. Although new, it is a fairly common practice:
The fraction of managers that manage more than one fund in our sample is about 27%, and also these managers manage about 30% of the total assets managed in domestic equity 4 We link CRSP and Thomson-Reuters data using the Mutual Fund Links database. We thank Russ Wermers for making this database available. For more detailed information, please see Wermers (2000) .
actively managed mutual funds.
5 Typically, a multi-fund manager manages two or three funds for more than four years. While our paper does not focus on how mutual fund managers become multi-fund managers and managers' incentives, Agarwal and Ma (2012) report that these managers usually performed well in the past and are more experienced. Then they either start new funds or take over other funds within the same fund company. Yadav (2010) shows that star funds can result in investors' flows into other funds managed by the same manager, and managers have an incentive to create low-match portfolios to increase the likelihood of generating a star fund. Note that a fraction of well performing mutual fund managers also manage hedge funds simultaneously, as documented by Nohel, Wang, and Zheng (2010) and Deuskar, Pollet, Wang, and Zheng (2011) .
In our analysis, we pick the two oldest funds from each multi-fund manager. To be included in the sample, we require that at any given month we have complete data on past monthly returns to estimate a manager's performance (in both funds) in the preceding 12 months. In the end, we have 20,383 fund-month observations in our baseline regression.
Measures and Empirical Methodology
The dependent variable of our regressions, F low it , is the proportional growth in total net assets (T NA it ) under management for fund i between the beginning and the end of month t, net of internal growth R it (assuming reinvestment of dividends and distributions).
Following Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), we winsorize the top and bottom 2.5% tails of the net flow variable to remove errors associated with mutual fund mergers and splits documented by Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) .
We use the four-factor alpha (Alpha i ) as a measure of fund performance. Alpha i is the risk-adjusted returns (α i ) in the preceding 12 months estimated using Carhart (1997) four-factor model:
To allow for different flow-performance sensitivities at different levels of performance, we use the piecewise linear specification from Sirri and Tufano (1998) . 6 For each month, we assign a fractional performance rank (Rank) ranging from 0 (poorest performance) to 1 (best performance) to funds according to their past 12-month four-factor alpha. Then we define three variables according to Rank: the lowest performance quintile as Lowperf Alpha = Min(Rank, 0.2), the three medium performance quintiles as Midperf Alpha = Min(0.6, Rank − Low), and the top performance quintile as Highperf Alpha = Rank − Mid − Low.
In our first set of tests, we run a flow-performance regression that is similar to Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007) . The dependent variable is flows into one of the funds of a multi-fund manager, F low (the subscript it is dropped for brevity). Our main coefficient of interest is the lagged performance in the other fund (Lowperf Alpha2, M idperf Alpha2, and Highperf Alpha2) of the same manager, while we control for the lagged performance in the same fund (Lowperf Alpha, Midperf Alpha, and Highperf Alpha). We also include a number of control variables in our analysis. To this end, we include a measure of fund age (ln(F undAge)) calculated by the natural logarithm of
(1 + fund age) and its interaction with Alpha, lagged fund size (ln(F undSize)) measured by the natural logarithm of fund TNA, lagged total expense (AverageT otalExpense) which is the sum of expense ratio plus one-seventh of the front-end load, a measure of the total risk of a fund measured by the standard deviation of fund raw returns in the preceding 12 months (StandardDeviation) and its interaction with Alpha, the total flows into the corresponding objective of the fund (ObjectiveF lows), and month fixed effects. Our baseline regression specification is as follows: 
We include both funds of a multi-fund manager unless otherwise stated. In our sample there are two funds for a given manager in a given month. These are counted as two observations. For example, in one observation, we study the flow into one fund (say, F1) and the performance in the other fund (say, F2) of the manager. Then in another observation, F2 becomes the fund in question and F1 becomes the "other fund." 7 We address concerns regarding correlations between error terms by clustering the standard errors in the regressions at the manager-level. We also include past flows, as well as manager fixed effects in some specifications.
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7 This setting has the advantage of studying both funds. In particular, Agarwal and Ma (2012) document that multi-fund managers can start multitasking by taking over existing funds. They show that the performance of and the flows into acquired funds and incumbent funds are different after being managed by the same manager. By studying both funds, we make sure that our results are not entirely due to one set of funds.
8 Monthly flows are predicted by fund performance in the preceding 12 months as well as past monthly flows (e.g. Coval and Stafford, 2007) . To make sure that Alpha2 is not simply capturing the serial correlation between the monthly flows, we control for flows in the preceding 6 months. We also control for manager fixed effects in our regressions. A few self-reported surveys and findings in the literature suggest that investors take into account certain family characteristics (e.g. Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) ) and manager-specific characteristics (e.g. Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Spalt (2011)) when choosing their funds. In addition, some papers document that managerial characteristics such as age and education are strongly correlated with managers' performance and the characteristics of their fund families (e.g. Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Greenwood and Nagel, 2009 ).
We also address concerns that some investors are not sophisticated enough to calculate excess fund returns as implied by our use of alphas in (1), and use style-adjusted returns instead of alphas in an alternative specification. The style-adjusted return is calculated as the average monthly return for the fund, in excess of the average return on all funds in the same CRSP investment objective code. The regression equation for this alternative specification is: . We report summary statistics on fund flow, TNA, performance and risk measures, age, total expenses and total family TNA. As evident from Table 1 , funds managed by multifund managers do not seem to be materially different from funds managed by single-fund managers: average flows into these two types of funds are both 0.9% per month, average alphas are at −2 to −4 bps per month, average fund age, size, total expense (1.6% per year), and family size are all similar. Table 2 compares the two funds of multi-fund managers. Again, we pick the two oldest funds: the first fund is the oldest, and the second fund the second oldest. As can be seen, the first fund is older and usually larger in fund size, and earns slightly more negative alphas. Other characteristics, such as standard deviation of return, average total expense, and loadings on the Carhart (1997) factors, are similar across the two funds.
Results: Cross-Fund Flow-Performance Relationship
In this section, we first present the empirical results of the regressions in equations (1) and (2) Table 3 shows the results of our regression ( is not), suggesting that investors pay attention and respond to another fund's performance, particularly when it is in the top quintile. 9 On the interpretation of the magnitude, if skills are entirely manager-specific, then the coefficients of Alpha and Alpha2 should be the same; if skills are fully fund-specific, the coefficients of Alpha2 should be zero. Our results therefore suggest that fund managers' skills are not entirely fund-specific or manager-specific (as documented by Baks (2003)): information from the other fund can help reveal managers' ability and sophisticated investors should learn from this extra signal.
Flow-Performance Relationship in Multi-funds
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The next two columns run the same regressions, but adding past flows as an extra control variable (in column (3)), as well as manager fixed effects (in column (4) flows into a fund respond to the performance in both funds, with the effect of the other fund one-third to half as strong as the fund in question.
It is possible that the significance of the coefficients of Alpha2 is due to family effects, since the two funds of the multi-fund managers belong to the same mutual fund family.
Column (1) of Table 4 addresses this concern by adding dummy variables that represent the stellar performance of other funds in its family, following Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) .
Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) find that the stellar performance can create a spillover effect to increase the inflows into other funds in the family, while Yadav (2010) shows that this spillover effect applies to multi-fund managers' funds. Column (2) includes family fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobservable family characteristics. The results in both columns are generally unaffected by these effects.
As a further robustness check, we repeat the regressions using style-adjusted returns instead of past 12-month 4-factor alphas as the performance measure (equation (2)).
12 The style-adjusted return is the past 12-month return on a fund in excess of the past 12-month returns on all funds in the same investment objective code. The results are reported in Table 5 . Similar to Table 3 , flows respond to past performance in the fund in question, as well as the other fund that the manager manages. The relationship is stronger when the performance in the other fund is in the top quintile.
Evidence on Manager-Specific Skills and Investor Sophistication
In this section, we argue that the multi-fund performance-chasing behavior we find is consistent with investor sophistication. We first establish that there is a manager-specific component in skills by examining the fund holdings. Suppose a multi-fund manager holds IBM in both of his two funds: 3% in Fund 1 and 5% in Fund 2. We remove all the common holdings (3% in IBM, and we repeat for all other stocks) and form two portfolios using only the uncommon parts. Then we calculate the Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas using the stock returns in the uncommon parts. Panel A of Table 6 reports summary statistics of the alphas of the uncommon portfolios. The mean (median) is 27 (21) bps per month.
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If skills have a manager-specific component, we expect that the uncommon alpha from one fund's portfolio should positively predict the uncommon alpha from the other fund's portfolio.
14 In other words, although the holdings do not overlap in the two funds, managers should show their skills in both portfolios. The results in Panel B of Table 6 confirm this.
When we sort the uncommon alpha of one fund based on the uncommon alpha of the other fund, there is a monotonic relationship across the quintiles, and the top quintile outperforms the lowest quintile by 37 bps per month (t-stat = 10.3). Together with our main findings in Table 3 , this suggests that investors are sophisticated enough to draw inferences about the manager's skills from the other fund's past performance.
Besides, if investors are learning about managers' ability, we believe that the performancechasing behavior should be more pronounced when the performance in the two funds is more different. Table 7 splits the full sample into two subsamples, based on the absolute difference between Alpha and Alpha2. When the difference is above the median, the magnitude and significance of the coefficients are similar to the full sample in Table 3 . However, when the difference is below the median, none of the Alpha2 variables are significant. We interpret this finding as the information of Alpha2 being more useful to sophisticated investors when it is more different from the signal provided by Alpha. 13 The magnitude is smaller than the "Best Ideas" measure in Cohen, Polk, and Silli (2009) , who show that the stock that managers display the most conviction towards ex-ante earns an abnormal return of around 2% per quarter. Managers sometimes hold the "Best Ideas" stocks in both funds, and sometimes only hold them in one of the funds; thus we expect that our measure excludes some of the best ideas and is a bit lower than that measure.
14 It is certainly possible that the alphas of two different stocks are correlated because of return correlation that is not captured by the Carhart (1997) factors; for example, two stocks are in the same industry or in the same style. We broadly interpret this correlation as skills, because it represents managers' value added relative to strategies based on known factors. We also achieve similar results using a six-factor model, which includes two additional factors constructed based on liquidity and short-term reversal.
Comparison: A Placebo Test Using Matching Funds Not Managed by the Same Manager
While our regressions control for many fund characteristics that are known to predict flows, there may be other market-wide events or factors impacting funds with similar characteristics. We now provide additional evidence with two sets of control funds. Let F1 be the fund in question and F2 be the other fund. 15 We then find two control funds, M1 and M2, to match F1 and F2, respectively. Our matching algorithm finds the "nearest fund," similar in spirit to the commonly-used stock-matching algorithm employed in Loughran and Ritter (1997) .
In particular, in each month we find a match for each multi-fund manager's fund from the universe of single-manager funds using the following:
1. We pick funds (in the same month) that come from the same family and whose assets are 25%-200% of the multi-fund manager's fund.
2. In the event that there is no eligible fund in 1 (family information is missing, or there are no family funds with 25%-200% assets), we pick funds (in the same month) whose assets are 90%-110% of the multi-fund manager's fund. We pick funds with the lowest Score 1 to be M1 and the lowest Score 2 to be M2.
The idea is to choose funds within the family and/or of similar size, and with the most similar characteristics that are included in the baseline flow-performance regression (Equation (1)). For M1, we match with F1 on Alpha, StandardDeviation, F undAge, and
AverageT otalExpense. For M2, we try to match with F2 on these characteristics except Alpha (since we need to use the Alpha of M2 in the analysis). Table 3 .
Non-parametric Tests Based on Flows into Characteristicmatched Funds
We now use M1 to further examine the flows into F1. We define the difference in flows as (F low into F1) minus (F low into M1). If there are certain characteristics (besides the manager) that attract investors' flows, flows into F1 and M1 should be similar. Therefore, this measure captures the flows into F1 of this particular manager, on top of a similar fund M1. Table 9 presents a univariate sort of the Dif f erenceinF lows (F1 − M1) on Alpha of
F2.
16 This test also has the advantage that it does not impose a parametric regression model like the previous one, and is therefore free from the concern that our results are driven by the choice of specification. As in Table 3 , the results are more prominent among the highperformers. When we compare the magnitude, the difference in flows is 0.91% per month in quintile 5 (the highest group), while the difference in flows is −0.31% per month in quintile 1. The difference quintile 5 minus quintile 1 is highly significant (t-stat = 7.6).
We have so far established evidence regarding that investors chase performance in a multi-fund manager setting. Section 4 contains the results regarding our second hypothesis:
the relationship between past performance in one fund and future performance in the other;
this serves as a test of whether investors move "enough" capital across funds in light of the size-performance relationship, in a mechanism similar to moving capital to eliminate performance persistence in the traditional single-fund setting.
Results: Cross-Fund Predictability
We are interested in whether there is any cross-fund predictability: can one fund's return predict subsequent performance in the other fund? The sign of such predictability is evidence that investors move too little (positive predictability) or too much (negative predictability) capital across funds. To see this, consider under the null that size erodes performance, if investors move too little capital out of the first fund (so that it is "too large") in response to poor past performance in the second fund, there will be a positive relationship between past performance in the second fund and future performance in the first (they are both negative).
A similar argument applies to cases where investors move too little capital into the first fund when the second fund performs well (both performance measures will be positive), and where investors move too much capital (the performance measures will have different signs). If the allocation is "correct," then we would not observe any relationship in the two performance measures.
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Our test is derived from the equilibrium in Berk and Green's (2004) model. Berk and Green (2004) argue that investors chase performance because they allocate more money to skillful managers, and diseconomies of scale causes inflows to drive down performance.
Investors competitively supply funds so that in equilibrium expected excess returns going forward are zero. Applying this to our multi-fund context, one expects to see zero predictability across the manager's two funds if investors allocate capital competitively.
Note that mutual fund returns generally show some persistence when the performance is poor, as documented by Carhart (1997 ). However, Lou (2012 finds that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by the predictable price pressure arising from flows: losing funds liquidate their existing holdings that are concentrated in past losing stocks when facing outflows, so the price pressure drives down the future return of these losing stocks and the funds tend to continue to perform poorly. As such, testing predictability in a single-fund setting may not directly measure investors' response to managers' past performance. We argue that this flow-induced effect is less pronounced in our setting because the holdings of the two funds are not the same. Flows into and out of one fund do not create as much price pressure on the holdings of the other fund. The cross-fund performance predictability test 17 Alternatively, it could be because that skills cannot be carried over from one fund to another.
is, therefore, a more direct test of the Berk and Green (2004) equilibrium condition.
To test our hypothesis, we form portfolios using the second fund (the second oldest fund) of the manager. We sort all the second funds into quintiles, based on the past 12-month alpha of the first fund (the oldest fund) of the manager. Unlike the previous analyses, each manager-month is regarded as one observation to avoid double counting. In each quintile, we form portfolios that are rebalanced monthly and hold for different time horizons t: 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months. Therefore, in each month we rebalance 1/t of each portfolio. For every quintile, the portfolio returns are the cumulative after-fee returns of the second funds in the corresponding quintile. The portfolio alphas are calculated by regressing the portfolio returns on Carhart (1997) four factors using the whole sample period. earns an alpha of around 20-31 bps per month.
19 Table 11 repeats the analysis using style-adjusted return of the first fund in the sorting, instead of past 12-month alpha. The results are similar (and somewhat stronger): the monotonic relationship is still observed and the long-short portfolio (5 minus 1) earns an alpha of between 30 and 67 bps per month.
We interpret the findings as follows: while there is generally insufficient response (i.e., investors do not move capital "enough") such that there is a positive relationship in the quintiles, the insufficient response mostly comes from the negative alphas in lower quintiles.
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18 Our results hold if we reverse the ordering of the first and second funds, or if we calculate portfolio alphas using a five-factor model (which includes Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) Liquidity factor).
19 Zheng (1999) shows that funds with positive flows outperform those with negative flows for up to 30 months. It is therefore possible that investor flows and future performance in multi-funds take longer than 12 months to reach equilibrium. We end at a 12-month horizon given our data limitations.
20 Similar to prior studies, if we study own-fund performance predictability in our sample, we also find Even after observing these poorly performing other funds, investors do not move enough capital out of their funds, resulting in larger funds and negative performance. One reason is that only existing investors respond to poor performance (because investors cannot short sell mutual funds), but good performance attracts both old and new investors. This finding is broadly consistent with our previous analyses, where we find that investors' response to past performance in the other fund is stronger when the fund is in the top quintile.
Finally, we verify the cross-fund predictability results using a regression framework. We regress the one-month-ahead risk-adjusted return on past alpha of the other fund, in the presence of past alpha of the fund in question and other characteristics:
+ β 5 ln(F undSize) + β 6 AverageT otalExpense
where
r t+1 is the raw return of fund i in month t+1 (the subscript i is dropped). The factor loadings β are estimated using preceding 12-month data in a Carhart (1997) model. Other variables in equation (3) are the same as those in equations (1) and (2). Similar to other regressions in the paper, in one observation, we study the risk-adjusted return of one fund (say, F1) and the alpha of the other fund (say, F2) of the manager. Then in another observation, F2
negative and significant alphas in the poorly performing quintiles. The results are stronger than those in Table 10 , but this predictability can be driven by the flow-induced price pressure, as Lou (2012) shows.
becomes the fund in question and F1 becomes the "other fund." return. This is similar in magnitude to the 5 minus 1 portfolio return in Table 10 .
Conclusion
In this paper we use a recent development -that of mutual fund managers who manage more than one fund -to help distinguish between rational and behavioral explanations of the performance-chasing behavior in mutual funds.
The evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that investors rationally infer managerial ability from past returns. For multi-fund managers, there is one additional piece of information on manager's past performance that investors can use over and above his performance in the fund under consideration -the manager's performance in his other fund. Do investors take this into account? We show that they indeed do: flows into a fund managed by a multi-fund manager are predicted by both the manager's performance in the corresponding fund and in the other fund he manages. Performance in one fund predicts flows into the other fund more strongly when the performance is particularly good, perhaps because fund managers (or companies) strategically create spillover effects by making high-performing funds more visible.
Next, we investigate whether investors allocate their capital across funds in a way similar in spirit to the model by Berk and Green (2004) . Under the null hypothesis that fund size erodes fund performance, we suggest a simple test by examining whether past performance in one fund of a multi-fund manager predicts subsequent performance in his other fund. If investors understand the size-performance relationship and take into account the manager's performance in both funds, they would allocate exactly the right amount of capital into every fund in question. As such, there would be no predictability in performance. However, we find evidence of positive cross-fund predictability; in particular, investors do not seem to withdraw enough capital in response to poor performance in the manager's other fund.
The multi-fund environment provides some unique insights on investor sophistication.
The cross-fund flow-performance relationship is stronger when the other fund's performance carries more additional information, that is, when the performance in the two funds is more different. We also believe that this information is relevant because skills are not entirely fundspecific, which means skills shown in one fund are likely to be applicable to the manager's other fund. Finally, the positive cross-fund performance predictability suggests that investors are rewarded by responding to the other fund's past performance. These results are more consistent with investor sophistication than behavioral biases. However, the sophistication is not up to the level that some theory models assume.
Overall, our paper contributes to the understanding of performance-chasing behavior in mutual funds. The evidence shows mixed results. Future work is needed to understand aspects that we do not find support for. In particular, one could further examine the sizeperformance relationship in multi-funds. We rely on Berk and Green's (2004) This table presents the summary statistics of the two funds of multi-fund managers. We pick the two oldest funds from each multi-fund manager. The oldest fund is the first fund (Panels A and C), and the second oldest fund is the second fund (Panels B and D). Alpha is the risk-adjusted returns in the preceding 12 months estimated using Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Standard Deviation is the standard deviation of fund raw returns in the preceding 12 months. Fund Age is the number of years since fund inception. Fund Size is the fund total net asset. Average Total Expense is the sum of expense ratio plus one-seventh of the front-end load. MKT , SMB , HML , and UMD are the funds' loadings on the Carhart (1997) Flow-Performance Regression in Multi-Funds Table 3 This table presents the results of the flow-performance regressions. The dependent variable is Flow , which is the proportional monthly growth in total assets under management, net of internal growth (assuming reinvestment of dividends and distributions). Alpha and Alpha2 are the risk-adjusted returns, respectively, of the fund in question and of the other fund managed by the same manager in the preceding 12 months estimated using Carhart (1997) four-factor model. For each month, we assign a fractional performance rank ranging from 0 (poorest performance) to 1 (best performance) to funds according to their Alpha and Alpha2 . Then we define three variables according to the rank: the lowest performance quintile as Lowperf = Min(Rank , 0.2), the three medium performance quintiles as Midperf = Min(0.6, Rank -Low ), and the top performance quintile as Highperf = Rank -MidLow .
Other control variables include: ln(Fund Age) , calculated by the natural logarithm of (1+Fund Age) and its interaction with Alpha ; ln(Fund Size) , measured by the natural logarithm of lagged fund TNA; Avg. Total Expense , the lagged sum of expense ratio plus one-seventh of the front-end load; Standard Deviation ( Stddev ) the standard deviation of fund raw returns in the preceding 12 months and its interaction with Alpha ; Objective Flows , the total flows into the corresponding objective of the fund, and month and manager fixed effects. The coefficients of fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the manager level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively.
(1) (Nanda, Wang, and Zheng, 2004) . The second column controls for Family Fixed Effects . The dependent variable is Flow , which is the proportional monthly growth in total assets under management, net of internal growth (assuming reinvestment of dividends and distributions). Alpha and Alpha2 are the riskadjusted returns, respectively, of the fund in question and of the other fund managed by the same manager in the preceding 12 months estimated using Carhart (1997) four-factor model. For each month, we assign a fractional performance rank ranging from 0 (poorest performance) to 1 (best performance) to funds according to their Alpha and Alpha2 . Then we define three variables according to the rank: the lowest performance quintile as Lowperf = Min(Rank , 0.2), the three medium performance quintiles as Midperf = Min(0.6, RankLow ), and the top performance quintile as Highperf = Rank -Mid -Low .
Other control variables include: ln(Fund Age) , calculated by the natural logarithm of (1+Fund Age) and its interaction with Alpha ; ln(Fund Size) , measured by the natural logarithm of lagged fund TNA; Average Total Expense , the lagged sum of expense ratio plus one-seventh of the front-end load; Standard Deviation , the standard deviation of fund raw returns in the preceding 12 months and its interaction with Alpha Objective Flows , the total flows into the corresponding objective of the fund, and month and manager fixed effects. The coefficients of fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the manager level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively.
(1) the proportional monthly growth in total assets under management, net of internal growth (assuming reinvestment of dividends and distributions). Style Adj Return and Style Adj Return2 are the style-adjusted returns, respectively, of the fund in question and of the other fund managed by the same manager. For each month, we assign a fractional performance rank ranging from 0 (poorest performance) to 1 (best performance) to funds according to their Alpha and Alpha2 . Then we define three variables according to the rank: the lowest performance quintile as Lowperf = Min(Rank , 0.2), the three medium performance quintiles as Midperf = Min(0.6, Rank -Low ), and the top performance quintile as Highperf = Rank -Mid -Low .
Other control variables include: ln(Fund Age) , calculated by the natural logarithm of (1+Fund Age) and its interaction with Style Adj Return ; ln(Fund Size) , measured by the natural logarithm of lagged fund TNA; Average Total Expense , the lagged sum of expense ratio plus one-seventh of the front-end load; Standard Deviation (Stddev ), the standard deviation of fund raw returns in the preceding 12 months and its interaction with Style Adj Return ; Objective Flows , the total flows into the corresponding objective of the fund, and month and manager fixed effects. The coefficients of fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the manager level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. Table 7 This table presents the results of the flow-performance regressions, splitting the whole sample into two based on the absolute difference between Alpha and Alpha2 . The first and second columns show the sample when the difference is above and below the median difference, respectively. The dependent variable is Flow , which is the proportional monthly growth in total assets under management, net of internal growth (assuming reinvestment of dividends and distributions). Alpha and Alpha2 are the risk-adjusted returns, respectively, of the fund in question and of the other fund managed by the same manager in the preceding 12 months estimated using Carhart (1997) four-factor model. For each month, we assign a fractional performance rank ranging from 0 (poorest performance) to 1 (best performance) to funds according to their Alpha and Alpha2 . Then we define three variables according to the rank: the lowest performance quintile as Lowperf = Min(Rank , 0.2), the three medium performance quintiles as Midperf = Min(0.6, Rank -Low ), and the top performance quintile as Highperf = Rank -Mid -Low .
Other control variables include: ln(Fund Age) , calculated by the natural logarithm of (1+Fund Age) and its interaction with Alpha ; ln(Fund Size) , measured by the natural logarithm of lagged fund TNA; Average Total Expense , the lagged sum of expense ratio plus one-seventh of the front-end load; Standard Deviation , the standard deviation of fund raw returns in the preceding 12 months and its interaction with Alpha Objective Flows , the total flows into the corresponding objective of the fund, and month and manager fixed effects. The coefficients of fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the manager level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. This table presents the results of the flow-performance regressions using matching funds. The dependent variable is Flow , which is the proportional monthly growth in total assets under management, net of internal growth (assuming reinvestment of dividends and distributions). Alpha and Alpha Matching 2 are the riskadjusted returns, respectively, of the fund in question and of a control fund (M2) in the preceding 12 months estimated using Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The control fund (M2) is a fund that has similar characteristics as the other fund managed by the same manager. For each month, we assign a fractional performance rank ranging from 0 (poorest performance) to 1 (best performance) to funds according to their Alpha and Alpha Matching 2 . Then we define three variables according to the rank: the lowest performance quintile as Lowperf = Min(Rank , 0.2), the three medium performance quintiles as Midperf = Min(0.6, RankLow ), and the top performance quintile as Highperf = Rank -Mid -Low .
Other control variables include: ln(Fund Age) , calculated by the natural logarithm of (1+Fund Age) and its interaction with Alpha ; ln(Fund Size) , measured by the natural logarithm of lagged fund TNA; Average Total Expense , the lagged sum of expense ratio plus one-seventh of the front-end load; Standard Deviation , the standard deviation of fund raw returns in the preceding 12 months and its interaction with Alpha Objective Flows , the total flows into the corresponding objective of the fund, and month and manager fixed effects. The coefficients of fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the manager level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. Portfolios are formed using the second fund of the manager. We sort all the second funds into quintiles, based on the past 12-month Carhart (1997) alpha of the first fund of the manager. Panel A sorts second funds on afterfee alpha of the first fund, and Panel B sorts on before-fee alpha of the first fund. In each quintile, portfolios are rebalanced monthly and held for different time horizons t : 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months. The portfolio returns are the cumulative after-fee returns of the second funds in the corresponding quintile. The portfolio alphas, reported in the table, are calculated by regressing the portfolio returns on Carhart (1997) four factors using the whole sample period. For each manager in a given month, the oldest fund is the first fund, and the second oldest fund is the second fund. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively.
(1) This table presents the results of the regressions of future performance on past performance. The dependent variable is Next Month Risk Adjusted Return , which is the raw return minus the factor loadings times realized factor premiums in the next month. The factor loadings are estimated from the preceding 12 months using Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Alpha and Alpha2 are the risk-adjusted returns, respectively, of the fund in question and of the other fund managed by the same manager in the preceding 12 months estimated using Carhart (1997) four-factor model.
Other control variables include: Flow , the proportional monthly growth in total assets under management, net of internal growth (assuming reinvestment of dividends and distributions); ln(Fund Age) , calculated by the natural logarithm of (1+Fund Age) and its interaction with Alpha ; ln(Fund Size) , measured by the natural logarithm of lagged fund TNA; Average Total Expense , the lagged sum of expense ratio plus one-seventh of the front-end load; Objective Flows , the total flows into the corresponding objective of the fund, and month and fund fixed effects. The coefficients of fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the manager level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively.
